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ARGUMENT 
The parties appear to agree that it would be error for a court to deny relief merely 
because a motion to set aside a default judgment fails to refer to a particular subsection of 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Br. Appellees at 7. For the reasons 
discussed in our opening brief, such a hyper-technical approach would be profoundly 
inconsistent with this Court's jurisprudence and sound judicial practice. See Br. 
Appellant at 14-17. The Judsons do not argue otherwise and indeed deny that failure to 
cite subsection (4) was even a basis of the decision below. See Br. Appellees at 7 
("Nowhere in the Court of Appeals opinion does it state that Wheeler waived its 
jurisdictional challenge merely because it failed to specifically cite to subsection (4) 
when it sought relief from the trial court."). 
Instead, the Judsons' defense of the decision below turns on two arguments: (1) 
that Wheeler never raised personal jurisdiction as a defense, and (2) that Wheeler failed 
to raise a meritorious defense with sufficient clarity. Both arguments are manifestly 
without merit. They turn on tenuous wordplay and a refusal to credit the plain language 
in Wheeler's moving papers. 
Relief from a default judgment is available under Rule 60(b) "if (1) the motion is 
timely; (2) there is a basis for granting relief under one of the subsections of 60(b); and 
(3) the movant has alleged a meritorious defense." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, If 
64, 150 P.3d 480, 504 (Utah 2006) (citing Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, 882 
P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994); State Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 
(Utah 1983) (plurality opinion)). Wheeler's motion satisfies these elements. 
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I. Wheeler Clearly Raised Personal Jurisdiction as a Basis for Relief from the 
Default Judgment Under Rule 60(b). 
The Judsons repeatedly deny that Wheeler even raised personal jurisdiction as a 
defense. See Br. Appellees at 7-9. With due respect, that is simply inaccurate. Indeed, 
the Judsons themselves repeatedly quote statements from Wheeler's motion papers 
demonstrating that it did exactly that. 
1. The Judsons argue that "Wheeler did not raise the issue of personal 
jurisdiction before the trial court as a basis for relief" Br. Appellees at 9. Not so. 
Wheeler's Rule 60(b) motion plainly stated that "personal jurisdiction is lacking in this 
matter due to the lack of purposeful availment and significant contacts with the forum 
state." (R. 32). Supporting that assertion was the affidavit of Wheeler's General Counsel 
stating that "Defendant does not purposely avail itself [of] the benefits and laws of the 
state of Utah." (R. 39). Thus, Wheeler expressly raised a personal jurisdiction defense. 
That the trial court failed to address that proffered defense was reversible error, not 
evidence that Wheeler raised no such objection at all. 
2. Taking another tack, the Judsons argue that Wheeler's Rule 60(b) motion 
did not actually contest jurisdiction but rather announced its intent to do so later. Id. at 9 
("Wheeler was not intending to contest jurisdiction with its motion. Rather, Wheeler 
indicated it would be able to show, sometime in the fiiture, that jurisdictional issues 
existed."). As support, the Judsons emphasize the statements that "'Wheeler will be able 
to demonstrate that . . . any assertion of jurisdiction over [Wheeler] is highly 
questionable.'" Id. (emphasis by the Judsons, quoting the decision below ("Op.") at 2-
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3). But this is mere wordplay. Grammatical tense does not affect the validity of 
Wheeler's right to be relieved of a void judgment. Neither the language of Rule 60(b) 
nor this Court's jurisprudence requires that the assertion of rights be expressed in the 
present tense. And even if it did, Wheeler met that requirement by stating in its motion 
that "personal jurisdiction is tacking in this matter." (R. 32, emphasis added). Further, 
as discussed below, it is entirely appropriate to assert that one "will" (in the future) 
establish the merits of a defense because all that is necessary to set aside a default 
judgment is a proffer (an assertion) of a meritorious defense that will later be proven in 
the course of litigation. 
3. The Judsons argue that the "Conclusion" of Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion 
"did not request that the trial court dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction." 
Br. Appellees at 8; see R. 32. The argument is misleading. True, Wheeler's motion did 
not expressly request that the entire case be dismissed immediately for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. It did not need to. Having plainly asserted that "personal jurisdiction is 
lacking," nothing in Rule 60(b) or this Court's jurisprudence obligated Wheeler to 
reiterate that defense in a different section of its motion in order to obtain relief. But 
even if there were such an unstated requirement, Wheeler's motion satisfied it by 
specifically stating in the concluding paragraph that it had "legitimate and valid legal 
defenses, including misjoinder and lack of personal jurisdiction." (R. 32, emphasis 
added). Moreover, under this Court's jurisprudence, the point of Wheeler's Rule 60(b) 
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motion was to assert meritorious defenses as a basis for setting aside the default 
judgment, not to seek a full-blown adjudication of the merits of those defenses. 
4. In a further twist, the Judsons add that "nowhere in Wheeler's motion does 
it assert that the judgment rendered is void." Br. Appellees at 8 (emphasis added). But 
no such assertion is necessary. A judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction is a 
legal nullity not because a party says so but because, as a matter of law, the absence of 
personal jurisdiction deprives the court of authority to bind the parties. See generally 
Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 608 (1990) (describing the centuries-long history 
behind the principle that "the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void"). The 
Judsons cite no authority for the proposition that the word "void" must be used when 
asserting a personal jurisdiction defense under Rule 60(b). 
5. The Judsons argue that "[n]owhere in Wheeler's proposed findings or order 
[submitted following the trial court's hearing on Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion] is 
jurisdiction referenced as a means for the trial court to find that the default judgment was 
void due to lack of personal jurisdiction." Br. Appellees at 8. Not true. Wheeler's 
proposed order stated that "Defendant has provided facts demonstrating that legal and 
valid defenses exist; namely, lack of personal jurisdiction and misjoinder of parties." 
(R. 91.) In any event, Wheeler's proposed (and rejected) order is irrelevant to its 
personal jurisdiction defense and this appeal. Wheeler asserted its personal jurisdiction 
and misjoinder defenses by motion as provided by Rule 60(b), and it is the adequacy of 
that motion and those defenses that are at issue here. 
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6. The Judsons' attempt to transform Rule 60(b)(4) into a pleading trap 
conflicts not only with Utah law but with federal precedents interpreting the analogous 
Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 
F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1979) (adjudicating a motion to set aside a default judgment for 
lack of personal jurisdiction when the defendant "did not specify which subdivision of 
60(b) he relied on"); Dennis Garberg & Assoc, v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 
773 (10th Cir. 1997) ("where the district court does not have jurisdiction over the 
defendant, the court must grant relief from a default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b)"). 
In short, Wheeler amply demonstrated in the motion and accompanying affidavits 
that "there is a basis for granting relief under one of the subsections of 60(b)." Menzies, 
150 P.3d at 504. Wheeler's proffered defense that "personal jurisdiction is lacking in this 
matter" based on lack of minimum contacts (R. 32) obligated the trial court to set aside 
the default judgment as potentially void. State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 
1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (labeling the absence of personal jurisdiction "fatal"). 
II. Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion Met the Meritorious Defense Standard. 
The Judsons argue that Wheeler's purportedly "ambiguous summary statements 
did not raise to the level of a 'clear and specific proffer of a defense'" sufficient to meet 
the meritorious defense standard. Br. Appellees at 11. They contend that "[i]f this Court 
were to accept Wheeler's argument, all that would be required of a party seeking relief 
from a judgment or order under Rule 60(b) would be that they simply allude to the fact 
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that, or mention somewhere in their motion that, personal jurisdiction may be at issue." 
Id. at 9. 
The Judsons misunderstand the law. The requisite "clear and specific proffer" of a 
meritorious defense does not require "clear and specific" proof establishing that the 
defendant will ultimately prevail on the defense. To satisfy the meritorious defense 
standard, Wheeler had only to set forth a "proposed defense containing allegations, facts, 
or claims that, if proven at trial, would preclude total or partial recovery." Lund v. 
Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277, 283 (Utah 2000) (emphasis added). It "need not 
actually prove its proposed defenses." Id. (emphasis added). Wheeler made a clear and 
specific proffer of a defense when it stated and argued in its Rule 60(b) Motion that 
"personal jurisdiction is lacking in this matter" and that the Judsons had sued the wrong 
party. (R. 31-32). Each proffered defense was sufficient because, if later proven, each 
"would preclude total or partial recovery." 
This Court's reasoning in Erickson and Lund makes clear that Wheeler's proffer of 
a personal jurisdiction defense suffices as a meritorious defense for purposes of Rule 
60(b). Because general allegations satisfy the meritorious defense standard for other 
defenses, it follows a fortiori that nothing more can be required where a party seeks to set 
aside a default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, this Court has 
emphasized that constitutional concerns presented by the application of the meritorious 
defense standard to a personal jurisdiction defense are avoided only because that standard 
is easily met by the kind of general denials expressed by Wheeler in its Rule 60(b) 
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Motion. See Erickson at 1149 n.2 ("Because we hold that a general denial such as the 
one offered in this case is sufficient to meet the meritorious defense requirement, it is 
unnecessary to reach [the defendants'] claim that the requirement is unconstitutional.") 
(emphasis added). 
Even if the Judsons were correct that some actual proof supporting Wheeler's 
personal jurisdiction were required (they are not), the motion still should have been 
granted. The affidavit in support of Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion set forth a brief but 
adequate factual basis for a personal jurisdiction challenge. (R. 39.) It established that 
Wheeler "operates it business in Nevada" and "does not purposely avail itself [of] the 
benefits and laws of the state of Utah." Id. The Judsons never challenged or rebutted this 
jurisdictional evidence with contrary evidence of their own. 
In any event, Wheeler adequately met the meritorious defense standard and it was 
error for the trial court to deny relief under Rule 60(b). 
III. The Judsons Are Not Entitled to Attorneys Fees. 
Lastly, the Judsons should not be awarded fees, regardless of the outcome. Their 
reliance on Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), is misplaced. There has 
been no adjudication by this Court on the merits and a nonresident defendant like 
Wheeler should not be required to pay attorneys fees as the price of challenging a deeply 
unsound default judgment that is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judsons do not deny that default judgments are disfavored and that 
"[gjenerally, courts should be liberal in granting relief against default judgments so that 
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cases may be tried on the merits." Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149. That is the guiding policy 
that should inform this Court's analysis here, as it has throughout this Court's default-
judgment jurisprudence. 
The failure of the courts below to set aside the default judgment against Wheeler 
was error. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision below and remand the 
case to the district court with instructions to vacate the default judgment. 
DATED this 28th day of June, 2010. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Alexander Dushki 
R. Shawn Gunnarson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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